lowed its fleet to sink into a mere assembly of armed
merchantmen. Things were at their worst in the days of Cromwell.
Taught by the severe lessons of that war, the United Provinces, under
an able ruler, had done much to mend matters, but full efficiency had
not yet been gained.

"In 1666 as in 1653," says a French naval writer, "the fortune
of war seemed to lean to the side of the English. Of the three
great battles fought two were decided victories; and the third,
though adverse, had but increased the glory of her seamen. This
was due to the intelligent boldness of Monk and Rupert, the
talents of part of the admirals and captains, and the skill of
the seamen and soldiers under them. The wise and vigorous
efforts made by the government of the United Provinces, and the
undeniable superiority of Ruyter in experience and genius over
any one of his opponents, could not compensate for the weakness
or incapacity of part of the Dutch officers, and the manifest
inferiority of the men under their orders."[35]

England, as has been said before, still felt the impress of Cromwell's
iron hand upon her military institutions; but that impress was growing
weaker. Before the next Dutch war Monk was dead, and was poorly
replaced by the cavalier Rupert. Court extravagance cut down the
equipment of the navy as did the burgomaster's parsimony, and court
corruption undermined discipline as surely as commercial indifference.
The effect was evident when the fleets of the two countries met again,
six years later.

There was one well-known feature of all the military navies of that
day which calls for a passing comment; for its correct bearing and
value is not always, perhaps not generally, seen. The command of
fleets and of single vessels was often given to soldiers, to military
men unaccustomed to the sea, and ignorant how to handle the ship, that
duty being intrusted to another class of officer. Looking closely into
the facts, it is seen that this made a clean division between the
direction of the fighting and of the motive power of the ship. This is
the essence of the matter; and the principle is the same whatever the
motive power may be. The inconvenience and inefficiency of such a
system was obvious then as it is now, and the logic of facts gradually
threw the two functions into the hands of one corps of officers, the
result being the modern naval officer, as that term is generally
unde