t knows
it, follows it easily into the relatively fixed position had by it in
the enemy's line. On the other hand, the ships of his own division do
not lose sight of the fire-ship. They accompany it as far as possible,
cover it with their artillery to the end of its course, and disengage
it before burning, if the fruitlessness of the attempt is seen soon
enough. Evidently under such conditions its action, always uncertain
(it cannot be otherwise), nevertheless acquires greater chances of
success." These instructive comments need perhaps the qualifying, or
additional, remark that confusion in the enemy's order at the time
that your own remains good gives the best opening for a desperate
attack. The writer goes on to trace the disappearance of the
fire-ship:--

"Here then we see the fire-ship at the point of its highest
importance. That importance will decrease, the fire-ship itself
will end by disappearing from engagements in _the open sea_,
when naval artillery becoming more perfect shall have greater
range, be more accurate and more rapid;[23] when ships receiving
better forms, greater steering power, more extensive and better
balanced sail power, shall be able, thanks to quicker speed and
handling, to avoid almost certainly the fire-ships sent against
them; when, finally, fleets led on principles of tactics as
skilful as they were timid, a tactics which will predominate a
century later during the whole war of American Independence,
when these fleets, in order not to jeopardize the perfect
regularity of their order of battle, will avoid coming to close
quarters, and will leave to the cannon alone to decide the fate
of an action."

In this discussion the writer has in view the leading feature which,
while aiding the action of the fire-ship, also gives this war of 1665
its peculiar interest in the history of naval tactics. In it is found
for the first time the close-hauled line-of-battle undeniably adopted
as the fighting order of the fleets. It is plain enough that when
those fleets numbered, as they often did, from eighty to a hundred
ships, such lines would be very imperfectly formed in every essential,
both of line and interval; but the general aim is evident, amid
whatever imperfections of execution. The credit for this development
is generally given to the Duke of York, afterward James II.; but the
question to whom the improvement is due is of little im