e repeated), did not in the least
influence or retard the event of the war. Such injuries, unaccompanied
by others, are more irritating than weakening. On the other hand, will
any refuse to admit that the work of the great Union fleets powerfully
modified and hastened an end which was probably inevitable in any
case? As a sea power the South then occupied the place of France in
the wars we have been considering, while the situation of the North
resembled that of England; and, as in France, the sufferers in the
Confederacy were not a class, but the government and the nation at
large. It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they
few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the
possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the
enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and
which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which
commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores. This overbearing power
can only be exercised by great navies, and by them (on the broad sea)
less efficiently now than in the days when the neutral flag had not
its present immunity. It is not unlikely that, in the event of a war
between maritime nations, an attempt may be made by the one having a
great sea power and wishing to break down its enemy's commerce, to
interpret the phrase "effective blockade" in the manner that best
suits its interests at the time; to assert that the speed and disposal
of its ships make the blockade effective at much greater distances and
with fewer ships than formerly. The determination of such a question
will depend, not upon the weaker belligerent, but upon neutral powers;
it will raise the issue between belligerent and neutral rights; and if
the belligerent have a vastly overpowering navy he may carry his
point, just as England, when possessing the mastery of the seas, long
refused to admit the doctrine of the neutral flag covering the goods.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] Davies: History of Holland.

[17] Republique d'Angleterre.

[18] Lefevre-Pontalis: Jean de Witt.

[19] Martin: History of France.

[20] Gougeard: Marine de Guerre.

[21] Since the above was written, the experience of the English autumn
manoeuvres of 1888 has verified this statement; not indeed that any
such experiment was needed to establish a self-evident fact.

[22] Chabaud-Arnault: Revue Mar. et Col. 1885.

[23] The recent development of rapid-firing and machine gun