positive
combination of the producers who follow such a course. Moreover, the
strike itself, if it continues for any length of time, creates a
scarcity of the products and a rise of prices. Though the employers in
the end may concede what their workers demand, or some part of it, the
settlement may not cost them anything, since the advance in prices may
enable them to take all that they give their men out of the pockets of
the public. The strike by a trade union against competing employers
has as one ground of early success the employers' distrust of each
other. The danger is that as soon as prices become at all firm, one or
another of the employers may quickly make terms with his men in order
to seize the opportunity for new business. For this very reason,
however, the range of possible gains from a strike running through a
whole subgroup is smaller than it would be if the employers were
organized, so that all of them could safely wait for a larger rise of
prices before making terms with their men. The possible increase of
pay without a combination on the employers' side is distinctly larger
than any which a strike against a single employer can usually secure.
_The Power of a Strike against a Union of Employers._--Still keeping
the supposition that there is no coercion invoked and that strikes are
quite orderly, we find that they may gain more when employers are
consolidated than when they are not so, but that they are likely to
encounter still greater resistance. The demand--"Pay us more and
charge it to the public"--may be conceded, and probably will be so if
the employers dread the hostility of their own men and the action of
the state in enforcing a resumption of business. If they have no such
dread, their power to resist a strike is much greater by reason of
consolidation. They can safely hold out long if the public will let
them do it. No one of them is in any danger of seeing others take his
customers. Their hold upon their constituency is secure, and their
power to tax the constituency and make it pay for whatever a strike
may cost is very great. A strike under such circumstances may win much
for the men or it may win nothing whatever, and the difference between
these results is mainly determined by the attitude of the people. If
the government will hold its hands and let the producers work their
will, they may (1) allow the strike to run for a time, concede
something to their men, and raise prices enough to r
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