llowed to
enjoy. Suppressing employers' monopolies would remove much of the
difficulty connected with arbitration, and putting an end to violence
on the men's part would remove almost all the remainder.

With monopolies in the field it is quite otherwise. Their gains are
not of the kind that it is for the interest of the public to let them
keep. The public claims these sums on grounds of equity and
expediency. It is a perverted distribution that gives them to their
present recipients; and this fact threatens to involve more and more
the processes of production themselves. Centralization, without
monopoly, increases the product of industry; but the monopolistic
feature that often attends it partially paralyzes the producing
forces, and must be gotten rid of before there can be a normal income
to divide and a normal way of dividing it. _The court of arbitration
itself cannot get rid of it_, and it would do harm if it should try to
do so. Drastically to cut down wages that have been raised by the
power of monopoly would injure some workmen without materially helping
others, and it would benefit chiefly the monopolistic employers. Such
a policy would bring the entire system of arbitration to an end; for
it is partly a fear that arbitration would not leave to favorably
situated unions as much as they can now get by strikes and boycotts
that prevents the system from coming into vogue. The state can end
the monopoly, but it must do it by other measures than installing
courts of arbitration. In the interim--long or short, as the case may
be--before these measures will have their effect, it is necessary to
proceed on a plan of securing by awards something like what would
result from actual trials of strength. The effects of adjudication
will not, in this interim, be ideal, but it is necessary to accept
this fact and struggle the harder to obtain conditions that will
improve them.

_Abnormal Conditions which Arbitrators must Accept._--Crude force of
one sort or another would sometimes give to organized labor twice or
thrice as much as free labor can earn at the social margin of
production, and the public approaches the problem of adjustment while
this condition exists. It may be that a trust has crushed competition,
made large gains for itself, and made it possible to pay employees at
a high rate; while, on the other hand, a trade union has made itself
strong, put pressure on the employers, excluded free laborers, and
secured