of supply as would be
requisite; but a temporary reduction of import duties would
often go far in this direction. And a measure which would
insure the running of the plant under a temporary
receivership would, of course, do it.

_The Practical Working of the Arbitration Proposed._--Let us see how
such a system of arbitration as is here described would work in the
case in which, as we have supposed, a strong trade union is dealing
with a monopolistic employer. At the outset all violence on the men's
side is ruled out. No assaulting, maiming, or killing of so-called
"scabs" is tolerated, and, moreover, the first temptation to this is
removed by the act of the state in recognizing for an interval the
men's tenure of place. There are no strike breakers to be attacked.
While proceedings of arbitration are pending, the obnoxious class is
out of sight, and all the places are transiently reserved for their
original holders. The court has submitted to it two possible rates of
pay, one demanded by the men and the other offered by the employers.
It may confirm either of these rates or any rate that is intermediate
between them, and it is likely to pursue the latter course. In any
case, it announces a rate, the one which to it appears to be fair and
is more likely to be so than the one claimed by either of the parties.
"This is a just rate," declares the tribunal to the men; "you may take
it or leave it, but if you leave it a certain thing will
happen,--workmen who refuse it will forfeit all claim upon their
positions." Workmen will not often refuse the award, and the pressure
of public opinion makes it improbable that the employer will do so.
Coupled with arbitration and an essential part of the system is a
policy which shall remove the danger of monopoly. In its perfectly
secure form monopoly as yet scarcely exists, but what does exist is a
great number of partial monopolies able to handle competitors roughly
and extort profits from the people. Directly connected with the
adjustment of wages is the disarming of such monopolies. The
preventing of strikes may often be accomplished without this, but the
insuring of just wages requires it. With a solution of the problem of
monopoly in view, all other needs of the situation might well be met
by arbitration without compulsory power.

We may now tabulate our conclusions.

1. In the making of the wages contract the individual laborer is at a
disadvantage. He has somet