is still
affected in indirect ways by the possible rivalry of lines altogether
outside of its territory. An excessive charge on freight from Chicago
to New York might induce carrying by rail from Chicago to Norfolk and
thence by water to New York. It might cause grain, flour, etc., to be
shipped to Europe from Southern ports rather than from those on the
Atlantic coast. These cases and others do not fall under principles
essentially different from those already stated, but they call for the
application of the same principles in complex conditions which our
study is too brief to cover. There is a supposable case in which
nearly all that could be secured by any railroad connecting Chicago
with the Atlantic coast, even though every line in the territory
between them were the property of one corporation, would be the
variable cost of carrying goods over a line running to a port on the
Gulf of Mexico. Reflection will easily show how the principles already
stated apply to this case and others.

_Effects of a General and Strong Consolidation._--With all the lines
in this country and Canada in a strong consolidation, the advance of
rates to, or well toward, the limit set by the principle of natural
place value created would inevitably come unless the power of the
state should in some way prevent it. The railroads would be able to
get the difference between the cost of goods at A, in the illustrative
case, and the cost of making or procuring them at B without using the
connecting line of railroad. When the appeal to the state is only
imminent,--when the power of the government is not yet exercised, but
impends over every railroad that establishes unreasonable
charges,--the rates may be held in a fair degree of restraint. A
wholesome respect for the _possibilities_ of lawmaking here takes the
place of actual statutes. A respect for the law appears in advance of
its enactment and may amount to submitting rates in an imperfect and
irregular way to the approval of the state. This effect, when it is
realized, is to be credited in part to laws which will never be
enacted. The merely potential law--that which the people will probably
demand if they are greatly provoked, but not otherwise--may be a
stronger deterrent than the prospect of more moderate legislation. In
general a considerable part of the economic lawmaking of the future
will undoubtedly be called out by demands for action that is too
violent to be taken except under great