war across the sea.

Germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is
more efficient, than any other country. The excellent training and
readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be
mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, Germany has
the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a
first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by England's. Finally,
the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords
additional security in transporting troops. These especially favorable
factors make possible a wide field for Germany's activity in world
politics. It is feasible for us to build strong military forces which
will be of great use to the Empire in this direction, to secure by
fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have
attained in Europe.

In this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the
near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a
position alone to solve for us the problems arising from energetic
participation in world politics. This shows the advisability of
impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to
direct attack and that have hitherto held Germany in little respect,
with the size and strength of our army. That is why we must keep in
mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea.

These operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with
the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small
enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war
as well as for colonial requirements. All, however, emphasize the
problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on
land and which make distinct demands for preparation. These newly
found difficulties should be carefully examined by Germany.

THEORETICAL VIEWS

I. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OVER THE SEA

Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial
intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in
them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use
of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. The main
difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces
must be combined. However, any consequent friction can easily be
avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with
their mutual dependence and with the need of individual coopera