nd, at the outbreak of the Boer, although lacking
full preparation during peace, in the course of a few weeks procured
the required number of ships for the first shipment.
The problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading
commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority
to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the German steamers for
military transporting. This commission should also list the
foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use
in emergencies. Through close commercial relations this control can be
extended to neighboring foreign ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
Copenhagen) to the end that we might charter several large foreign
steamers.
The construction of stables for horses on our commercial ships would
cause delay, as we have pointed out previously. It would seem
advantageous to have our subsidized steamship companies to build
several ships which can be quickly adjusted for shipping horses. This
ought to be an easy matter with ships used for shipping cattle. The
Hamburg-American Line, it is known, will readily provide such a ship.
The management of the transport depots and the training of the
dry-dock and harbor personnel would obviously fall to the loading
commission. In a similar way, the navy would be permitted to divide
the sea-fighting strength, in the event of mobilization, into a fleet
of warships and an escort for the transport fleet, assuring effective
protection and a fighting force equal in rank to the enemy.
PREPARATIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.
Actual preparations for war cannot be kept secret for any length of
time. Opponents would receive information through secret channels,
which would give them opportunity to concentrate and equip their
forces. The immediate preparations before the outbreak of war dare not
be instituted generally, but as soon as the decision for operations is
conceived, they must be promptly inaugurated. The aim should be to
keep the opponents in uncertainty for a short time, and then a rapidly
executed operation would take them unawares. An unexpected attack
depends largely upon rapidity of movement. Incidentally, diplomatic
pressure should be avoided if possible because such friction would
lessen considerably the chances for a successful undertaking.
In connection with wars on land the preliminary preparations are
simplified, for under these circumstances most of the battleships and
troops have been equi
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