in rank than the
commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the
vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. More than one
well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral
because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land
operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. On the
other hand, Napoleon I, against the advice of his admirals,
disembarked his troops in Egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing
the fate of the fleet.
After successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport
fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. Even
the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base
is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. For
technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an
officer of the Admiral Staff. In a joint attack on a coast city the
advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. In the battle on
the Alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the
flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not
brought about in unison with the land attack.
II. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SEA TRANSPORTATION
PREPARATIONS DURING PEACE.
Whether the operations be large or small, full preparations must be
made during peace. These preparations include first of all the drawing
up of plans through the study of political and military relations.
Then the operations can be carried out under international
jurisdiction, avoiding thereby any disturbances of importance. The
possibilities of friction must be given careful thought.
First of all, a base for prospective operations must be determined by
exhaustive investigations as to landings that may be suitable. While
the first inquiries are made by naval officers, they can only be
completed by army officers. The following essential points must be
kept in view in searches made by naval officers:
I. To determine the naval strength required for protection of the
transport fleet and to settle the question of communication with home
ports.
II. To decide upon proper and specific points on the respective
coasts, from a marine standpoint.
III. To investigate all harbor facilities for the disembarking of the
troops, and to ascertain the number and size of ships the harbor will
admit so as to insure the protection of the land and sea flank.
IV. To study the enemy's coast defe
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