re more vulnerable than
inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from
land and water. However, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command
of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the
operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on
land.

REEMBARKATION.

A reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the
battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. In the event of
defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if
good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites,
with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. If
the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations
for its defense must be made in advance. When the reembarkation is
done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as
explained in the chapter on "Embarkation" must be adhered to. For
such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy
should not be permitted to interfere with its management.

APPLICATION

I. CONSIDERATION OF LANDING OPERATIONS AGAINST POWERS
THAT CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY SEA

The recognized military complication with England and America affords
an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in
which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the
strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and
lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of
the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures.

A conflict with England must be fixed in the eye of Germany, for the
great German struggle for commerce represents to England just as great
a danger as the advance of Russia against India. Beginning operations
with a naval war with England, we could almost foresee the result.

England has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active
navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to
win a decisive victory. Only by closing an alliance with Russia would
the strength of England be injured indeed, but never by a direct
threat from these provinces. But an alliance with France would in fact
menace England. The latter, however, through her geographical location
and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined
operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime
superiority against this alliance.