e guns on shore or of the escorting battleships,
should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. The landed troops
should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin
operations independent of the supply trains.
The time required for landing is considerably less than for loading.
The natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the
time. One writer gives the following data: Lord Cochran landed 18,000
men on the open coast of America in five hours; in the Crimean War the
English accomplished the disembarking of 45,000 men, 83 guns and about
100 horses in less than eleven hours. The French are slower on account
of their handling of supply trains. The Russians, in their landing
maneuvers in the Black Sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and
one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six
kilometers from the coast. The marine writer Degories figures that
under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000
cavalry and 60 guns in six hours. If the landing can be made in a
harbor, this time can be essentially lessened.
After the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the
transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime
strength of the country attacked. If the assailant continues in
command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base
for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the
expedition. If the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the
transport fleet must attempt to evade the operations of the hostile
fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters.
OPERATIONS.
The operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be
conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of
the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular
conditions under which the forces operate. The well-known marine
writer, Mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be
offensive to succeed. Military history shows that after boldly carried
out landings at Abukir and Cape Breton, for example, the success of
the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of
energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. The assembled
strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance.
Defensive strategy should be used only when a delay is necessary to
receive expected reenforcements. The primary aim of the operations is
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