interest in the offices, was not slow to
manifest its contempt for "the man of the people" and his "hungry"
followers. But there was still another trouble. Secretary Eaton had
married the daughter of a tavern-keeper; her reputation was unsavory and
notorious. She now proposed to enter Washington social life as a leader,
and Jackson gave her his blessing. The wives of the members of the
Cabinet refused to recognize Mrs. Eaton, and a social war followed, in
which President, preachers to the various local churches, and newspaper
editors had their say. Division in the Cabinet, bitter enmity between
certain leaders of the party, and the greater war between the powerful
industrial and agricultural sections of the country gave every assurance
that a storm was approaching.

To postpone the evil day Jackson resorted to evasions and oracular
utterances on the tariff and the other serious problems in all his
public papers and speeches. But the South pressed every day its
free-trade program; the East demanded at least a continuation of the
measure of protection already accorded to its interests; and the West,
really needing roadways and canals, insisted on the building of these
improvements and on the opening of the public lands to settlement on
easier terms. If the President yielded to any of these groups, his
administration was likely to fail. He naturally sought to shift the
issue and felt the public pulse on the question of a renewal of the
charter of the National Bank, which was not to expire till 1836. This
was looking to the future; but on this subject it was possible to
continue the union of South and West. The first annual message, in which
the Bank was discussed, aroused at once the great financial interests,
and they set in motion influences which speedily isolated the President
and secured to the Bank the enthusiastic support of a Cabinet, divided
on everything else, and of a majority of both houses of Congress.
Instead of preventing a disruption of his party, Jackson had only
hastened the event.

The people of South Carolina, supported as they hoped by most of the
South, pressed through Calhoun, during the winter of 1828-29 and again
in 1829-30, for some assurance that the President would aid them in
their attack upon the protective policy of the Government, threatening
state intervention in case of refusal. The East was no less insistent
that nothing should be done. Congress seemed to be completely
deadlocked. Unde