d to the ruin of their naval states.

The Peloponnesian was largely a naval war. The confidence of
the Athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its
outbreak. The immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in
time involved so many states, was the opportunity offered by the
conflict between Corinth and Corcyra of increasing the sea-power of
Athens. Hitherto the Athenian naval predominance had been virtually
confined to the AEgean Sea. The Corcyraean envoy, who pleaded for
help at Athens, dwelt upon the advantage to be derived by the
Athenians from alliance with a naval state occupying an important
situation 'with respect to the western regions towards which the
views of the Athenians had for some time been directed.'[15]
It was the 'weapon of her sea-power,' to adopt Mahan's phrase,
that enabled Athens to maintain the great conflict in which she
was engaged. Repeated invasions of her territory, the ravages
of disease amongst her people, and the rising disaffection of
her allies had been more than made up for by her predominance
on the water. The scale of the subsequent Syracusan expedition
showed how vigorous Athens still was down to the interruption
of the war by the peace of Nicias. The great expedition just
mentioned over-taxed her strength. Its failure brought about
the ruin of the state. It was held by contemporaries, and has
been held in our own day, that the Athenian defeat at Syracuse
was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the
force in Sicily properly supplied and reinforced. This explanation
of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected.
The friends of unsuccessful generals and admirals always offer
it, being sure of the support of the political opponents of the
administration. After the despatch of the supporting expedition
under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, no further great reinforcement,
as Nicias admitted, was possible. The weakness of Athens was in
the character of the men who swayed the popular assemblies and
held high commands. A people which remembered the administration of
a Pericles, and yet allowed a Cleon or an Alcibiades to direct its
naval and military policy, courted defeat. Nicias, notwithstanding
the possession of high qualities, lacked the supreme virtue of
a commander--firm resolution. He dared not face the obloquy
consequent on withdrawal from an enterprise on which the popular
hopes had been fixed; and therefore he allowed a reverse to be