ce of a fleet of merchant vessels
carrying sorely needed supplies of food, and in this he was
completely successful. His plan involved the probability, almost
the necessity, of fighting a general action which he was not at
all sure of winning. He was beaten, it is true; but the French
made so good a fight of it that their defeat was not nearly so
disastrous as the later defeats of the Nile or Trafalgar, and--at
the most--not more disastrous than that of Dominica. Yet no one
even alleges that there was disorder or disorganisation in the
French fleet at the date of anyone of those affairs. Indeed,
if the French navy was really disorganised in 1794, it would
have been better for France--judging from the events of 1798 and
1805--if the disorganisation had been allowed to continue. In
point of organisation the British Navy was inferior, and in point
of discipline not much superior to the French at the earliest
date; at the later dates, and especially at the latest, owing
to the all-pervading energy of Napoleon, the British was far
behind its rival in organisation, in 'science,' and in every
branch of training that can be imparted without going to sea.
We had the immense advantage of counting amongst our officers
some very able men. Nelson, of course, stands so high that he
holds a place entirely by himself. The other British chiefs,
good as they were, were not conspicuously superior to the Hawkes
and Rodneys of an earlier day. Howe was a great commander, but
he did little more than just appear on the scene in the war.
Almost the same may be said of Hood, of whom Nelson wrote, 'He
is the greatest sea-officer I ever knew.'[45] There must have
been something, therefore, beyond the meritorious qualities of
our principal officers which helped us so consistently to victory.
The many triumphs won could not have been due in every case to
the individual superiority of the British admiral or captain to
his opponent. There must have been bad as well as good amongst
the hundreds on our lists; and we cannot suppose that Providence
had so arranged it that in every action in which a British officer
of inferior ability commanded a still inferior French commander
was opposed to him. The explanation of our nearly unbroken success
is, that the British was a thoroughly sea-going navy, and became
more and more so every month; whilst the French, since the close
of the American war, had lost to a great extent its sea-going
character and, because