converted into an overwhelming disaster. 'The complete ruin of
Athens had appeared, both to her enemies and to herself, impending
and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic
had been her rally, that [a year after Syracuse] she was found
again carrying on a terrible struggle.'[16] Nevertheless her
sea-power had indeed been ruined at Syracuse. Now she could wage
war only 'with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system.'
Even before Arginusae it was seen that 'superiority of nautical
skill had passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies.'[17]

[Footnote 15: Thirwall, _Hist._Greece_, iii. p. 96.]

[Footnote 16: Grote, _Hist._Greece_, v. p. 354.]

[Footnote 17: _Ibid._ p. 503.]

The great, occasionally interrupted, and prolonged contest between
Rome and Carthage was a sustained effort on the part of one to
gain and of the other to keep the control of the Western
Mediterranean. So completely had that control been exercised
by Carthage, that she had anticipated the Spanish commercial
policy in America. The Romans were precluded by treaties from
trading with the Carthaginian territories in Hispania, Africa,
and Sardinia. Rome, as Mommsen tells us, 'was from the first a
maritime city and, in the period of its vigour, never was so
foolish or so untrue to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect
its war marine and to desire to be a mere continental power.' It
may be that it was lust of wealth rather than lust of dominion
that first prompted a trial of strength with Carthage. The vision
of universal empire could hardly as yet have formed itself in the
imagination of a single Roman. The area of Phoenician maritime
commerce was vast enough both to excite jealousy and to offer
vulnerable points to the cupidity of rivals. It is probable that
the modern estimate of the sea-power of Carthage is much exaggerated.
It was great by comparison, and of course overwhelmingly great
when there were none but insignificant competitors to challenge
it. Mommsen holds that, in the fourth and fifth centuries after
the foundation of Rome, 'the two main competitors for the dominion
of the Western waters' were Carthage and Syracuse. 'Carthage,'
he says, 'had the preponderance, and Syracuse sank more and more
into a second-rate naval power. The maritime importance of the
Etruscans was wholly gone.... Rome itself was not exempt from
the same fate; its own waters were likewise commanded by foreign
fleets.' The Roman