ed in the
next place if it is always moved. This being demonstrated, the next
inquiry is if that which is always moved, is self-moved; and this again
being demonstrated, it is considered whether that which is self-moved is
the principle of motion, and afterwards if the principle is unbegotten.
This then being admitted as a thing acknowledged, and likewise that what
is begotten is incorruptible, the demonstration of the thing proposed is
thus collected. If there is a principle, it is unbegotten and
incorruptible. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. Soul
is self-moved. Soul therefore (i.e. the rational soul) is incorruptible,
unbegotten, and immortal.
Of the third species of analysis, which proceeds from the hypothetical to
that which is unhypothetical, Plato has given a most beautiful specimen
in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides. For here, taking for his
hypothesis that the one is, he proceeds through an orderly series of
negations, which are not privative of their subjects, but generative of
things which are as it were, their opposites, till he at length takes
away the hypothesis that the one is. For he denies of it all discourse
and every appellation. And thus evidently denies of it not only that it
is, but even negation. For all things are posterior to the one; viz.
things known, knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge. And thus,
beginning from the hypothetical, he ends in that which is unhypothetical,
and truly ineffable.
Having taken a general survey, both of the great world and the microcosm
man, I shall close this account of the principal dogmas of Plato, with
the outlines of his doctrine concerning Providence and Fate, as it is a
subject of the greatest importance, and the difficulties in which it is
involved are happily removed by that prince of philosophers.
In the first place, therefore, Providence, according to common
conceptions, is the cause of good to the subjects of its care; and Fate
is the cause of a certain connection to generated natures. This being
admitted, let us consider what the things are which are connected. Of
beings, therefore, some have their essence in eternity, and others in
time. But by beings whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose
energy as well as their essence is eternal; and by beings essentially
temporal, those whose essence is always in generation, or becoming to be,
though this should take place in an infinite time. The media between
these
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