urther, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife
without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take
her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge
of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species
of lust.

_On the contrary,_ Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore
states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore
rape is a species of lust.

_I answer that,_ Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a
species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes
there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate
a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin
and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to
the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by
force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape
differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by
force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while
sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated,
but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act
of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is
employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or
one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad
Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor abductors
whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of
their crime."

There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force,
violates a virgin unlawfully.

Reply Obj. 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one
is sometimes used to signify the other.

Reply Obj. 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the
greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear
to endanger himself by offering violence.

Reply Obj. 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to
be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For
one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed,
who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that
is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her
father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her
parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, sinc