ecepts had to be given first, so that by their
means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though
affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of
generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as
stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning
God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our
insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).
Reply Obj. 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some
served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images.
Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped
gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the
words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Among others the worship
of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very
making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt
not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship of those
same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.
Reply Obj. 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some
compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood
to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 3]
Whether the Second Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the
name of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7:
"Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it
forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut.
5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," adds,
i.e. "by giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they
forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of
unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes
religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first,
whereby superstition is forbidden.
Obj. 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes--for
instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally
speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col.
3:17, "All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the
name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of
God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the pre
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