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blish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor. Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is concerned with operations and external things, wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality established is another. Reply Obj. 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz. "not to do evil"; for this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term "decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person resists against an instigation to do evil. Reply Obj. 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the formal and completive part. _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 2] Whether Transgression Is a Special Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin. For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine law." Therefore transgression is not a species of sin. Obj. 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a "word, deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature, or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin. Obj. 3: Further, no species co
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