nteen Articles)

We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive
power?

(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?

(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?

(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?

(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?

(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?

(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?

(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?

(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer;

(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?

(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?

(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?

(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?

(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?

(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]

(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art.
15]

(17) of the different kinds of prayer.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 1]

Whether Prayer Is an Act of the Appetitive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive
power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is
heard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire
of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the
appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to
begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves
to God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by
love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs
to the appetitive power.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there
are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is
"the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend
what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis,"
whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may
be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to
the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.
Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the
appetitive power.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak."
Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not
of the appetitive,