(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?

(3) Whether omission is a special sin?

(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 1]

Whether to Decline from Evil and to Do Good Are Parts of Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good
are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a
good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the
whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be
reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, "Turn away from evil and do
good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin,
the latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves the life and the palm." But
any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to
decline from evil is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the
other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining
from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good
at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are
not parts of justice.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that
"declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law.

_I answer that,_ If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs
to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they
cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the
sense of "all virtue" [*Cf. Q. 58, A. 5]. And yet even if justice be
taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good;
namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.

On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good
as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special
justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid
the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor;
while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the
community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.

Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of
special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of
justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our
relations with others, as shown above (Q. 58, A. 2): and it pertains
to the same cause to esta