gs that He hath rendered to me?"
In this respect _religion_ is annexed to justice since, according to
Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and
ceremonial rites or worship to "some superior nature that men call
divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an
equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares
(Ethic. viii, 14); and thus _piety_ is annexed to justice, for
thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man "renders service
and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his
country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man
is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus _observance_ is
annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53)
in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth."

A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which
one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due
is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On
the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in
respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies
necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so
necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this
has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered
from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to
this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he
is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed _truth,_
whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future
things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from
the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the
reward he receives with what he has done--sometimes in good things;
and then annexed to justice we have _gratitude_ which "consists in
recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in
desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)--and
sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed _revenge,_
whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist force,
injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense."
[*St. Thomas read _obscurum,_ and explains it as meaning
_derogatory,_ infra