stated (Q. 1,
AA. 1, 2, 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we
believe in a God, but because we believe God.

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God
is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are
done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is
related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and
consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the
last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred
to the end.

Reply Obj. 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end,
moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with
matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith,
hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper
object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion,
which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says
that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but as
its end.

Reply Obj. 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual,
but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a
mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by
establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I
do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God
as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability
and God's acceptance.

And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the
Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as
regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom
it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some
other circumstance.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 6]

Whether Religion Should Be Preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to
the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in
its observing the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But religion
fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an
absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than
the other moral virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more
praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater
need: wherefore it is written (Isa