extent, do those good works for which the good of nature
suffices.

Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For
even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or
even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to
the end of his unbelief.

Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the
life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is
taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence
the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts
according to his unbelief, sins grievously."

Reply Obj. 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the
supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can
direct the intention in respect of a connatural good.

Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in
unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them,
whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With
regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not
an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God,
whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the
truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent
to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 5]

Whether There Are Several Species of Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends
not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not
several species of unbelief, according to the various points which
the unbeliever disbelieves.

Obj. 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in
an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of
unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to
follow that there is an infinite number of