d about matters of belief.
One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning
things to be believed from things not to be believed: in this way
knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a
knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what
one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to
induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This
knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not
given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted,
adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to
believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the
godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."

Reply Obj. 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and
intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the
theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the
perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is
not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological
virtue.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 2]

Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine
things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets,
nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things,
because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).
Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than
acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore
is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, "the invisible things of God
. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made." If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems
that there is also knowledge of Divine things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge
of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of
human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."

_I answer that,_ A sure judgment about a thing is formed chiefly from
its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the
order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the
second, so ought the judgmen