t about the second cause to be formed
through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first
cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed
through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.

Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short
of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most
perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of
convertible terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given
the special name of "definition," but the convertible terms which
fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called "proper"
terms.

Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment
as stated above (A. 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived
from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is
wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows
the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of
all matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who
knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the
knowledge of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge
of human things is called "knowledge," this being the common name
denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment
which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take
knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom,
so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.

Reply Obj. 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet
faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence
to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge,
but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of
union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of
wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic
acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special
gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through
created things.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), every cognitive habit
regards formally the mean through which things are known, and
materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since
that which is formal, is of most account, it follow