rs of the
globe the best of missionaries to spread the Imperial idea. Instead of
wrecking the British Empire the German-made war should rebuild it
on the soundest of foundations, affection, mutual trust, and common
interest.

CHAPTER III

DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK

General Allenby's first problem was of vital consequence. He had to
pierce the Gaza line. Before his arrival there had been, as already
stated, two attempts which failed. A third failure, or even a
check, might have spelt disaster for us in the East. The Turks held
commanding positions, which they strengthened and fortified under the
direction of German engineers until their country, between the sea and
Beersheba, became a chain of land works of high military value, well
adapted for defence, and covering almost every line of approach.
The Turk at the Dardanelles had shown no loss of that quality of
doggedness in defence which characterised him in Plevna, and though we
know his commanders still cherished the hope of successfully attacking
us before we could attempt to crush his line, it was on his system of
defence that the enemy mainly relied to break the power of the British
force. On arriving in Egypt General Allenby was given an appreciation
of the situation written by Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, who
had commanded the Desert Column in various stages across the sands of
Sinai, was responsible for forcing the Turks to evacuate El Arish,
arranged the dash on Magdaba by General Sir Harry Chauvel's mounted
troops, and fought the brilliant little battle of Rafa. This
appreciation of the position was the work of a master military mind,
taking a broad comprehensive view of the whole military situation in
the East, Palestine's position in the world war, the strategical and
tactical problems to be faced, and, without making any exorbitant
demands for troops which would lessen the Allies' powers in other
theatres, set out the minimum necessities for the Palestine force.
General Allenby gave the fullest consideration to this document, and
after he had made as complete an examination of the front as any
Commander-in-Chief ever undertook--the General was in one or other
sector with his troops almost every day for four months--General
Chetwode's plan was adopted, and full credit was given to his
prescience in General Allenby's despatch covering the operations up to
the fall of Jerusalem.

It was General Chetwode's view at the time of writing his
app