s provided by the troops,
the utilisation of the earthwork of the enemy's line for our own
railway, luck as regards the weather and the fullest use of sea
transport, should enable us to give the enemy less breathing time than
appeared possible on paper. It was beyond hope, however, whatever
preparations were made, that we should be able to pursue at a speed
approaching that which the river made possible in Mesopotamia. General
Chetwode considered it would be fatal to attempt an offensive with
forces which might permit us to attack and occupy the enemy's Gaza
line but which would be insufficient to inflict upon him a really
severe blow, and to follow up that blow with sufficient troops. No
less than seven infantry divisions at full strength and three cavalry
divisions would be adequate for the purpose, and they would be
none too many. Further, if the Turks began to press severely in
Mesopotamia, or even to revive their campaign in the Hedjaz, a
premature offensive might be necessitated on our part in Palestine.

The suggestion made by General Chetwode for General Allenby's
consideration was that the enemy should be led to believe we intended
to attack him in front of Gaza, and that we should pin him down to
his defences in the centre, while the real attack should begin on
Beersheba and continue at Hareira and Sheria, and so force the enemy
by manoeuvre to abandon Gaza. That plan General Allenby adopted after
seeing all the ground, and the events of the last day of October and
the first week of November supported General Chetwode's predictions to
the letter. Indeed it would be hard to find a parallel in history for
such another complete and absolute justification of a plan drawn up
several months previously, and it is doubtful if, supposing the Turks
had succeeded in doing what their German advisers advocated, namely
forestalling our blow by a vigorous attack on our positions, there
would have been any material alteration in the working out of the
scheme. The staff work of General Headquarters and of the staffs of
the three corps proved wholly sound. Each department gave of its best,
and from the moment when Beersheba was taken in a day and we secured
its water supply, there was never a doubt that the enemy could be kept
on the move until we got into the rough rocky hills about Jerusalem.
And by that time, as events proved, his moral had had such a
tremendous shaking that he never again made the most of his many
opportun