le to close up
the gap between it and the XXIst Corps owing to the length of its
marches and the distance it was from railhead, and the scheme
therefore provided that the XXIst Corps should confirm successes
gained on our right by forcing its way through the tremendously strong
Gaza position to the line of the wadi Hesi and joining up with Desert
Mounted Corps. A considerable number of XXth Corps troops would then
return to the neighbourhood of railhead and release the greater
part of its transport for the infantry of XXIst Corps moving up the
Maritime Plain.
This, in summary form, was the scheme General Allenby planned before
the middle of August, and though the details were not, and could not
be, worked out until a couple of months had passed, it is noteworthy
as showing that, notwithstanding the moves an enterprising enemy had
at his command in a country where positions were entirely favourable
to him, where he had water near at hand, where the transport of
supplies was never so serious a problem for him as for us when we got
on the move, and where he could make us fight almost every step of
the way, the Commander-in-Chief foresaw and provided for every
eventuality, and his scheme worked out absolutely and entirely
'according to plan,' to use the favourite phrase of the German High
Command.
When the Corps Commanders began working out the details two of the
greatest problems were transport and water. Only patience and skilful
development of known sources of supply would surmount the water
difficulty, and we had to wait till the period of concentration before
commencing its solution. But to lighten the transport load which must
have weighed heavily on Corps Staffs, the Commander-in-Chief agreed to
allow the extension of the railway east of Shellal to be begun sooner
than he had provided for. It was imperative that railway construction
should not give the enemy an indication of our intentions. If he had
realised the nature and scope of our preparations he would have done
something to counteract them and to deny us that element of surprise
which exerted so great an influence on the course of the battle.
General Allenby, however, was willing to take some risks to simplify
supply difficulties, and he ordered that the extension to a railway
station north-east of Karm should be completed by the evening of the
third day before the attack, that a Decauville line from Gamli, not to
be begun before the sixth day prior to th
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