ents,
and upon which they depended largely for the manufacture and repair of
arms. But perhaps even more important than the military damage to the
South resulting from its capture, was its effect upon Northern politics.
Until then the presidential campaign in progress throughout the free
States was thought by many to involve fluctuating chances under the
heavy losses and apparently slow progress of both eastern and western
armies. But the capture of Atlanta instantly infused new zeal and
confidence among the Union voters, and from that time onward, the
reelection of Mr. Lincoln was placed beyond reasonable doubt.

Sherman personally entered the city on September 8, and took prompt
measures to turn it into a purely military post. He occupied only the
inner line of its formidable defenses, but so strengthened them as to
make the place practically impregnable. He proceeded at once to remove
all its non-combatant inhabitants with their effects, arranging a truce
with Hood under which he furnished transportation to the south for all
those whose sympathies were with the Confederate cause, and sent to the
north those who preferred that destination. Hood raised a great outcry
against what he called such barbarity and cruelty, but Sherman replied
that war is war, and if the rebel families wanted peace they and their
relatives must stop fighting.

"God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it be more
humane to fight with a town full of women, and the families of a brave
people at our back, or to remove them in time to places of safety among
their own friends and people."

Up to his occupation of Atlanta, Sherman's further plans had neither
been arranged by Grant nor determined by himself, and for a while
remained somewhat undecided. For the time being, he was perfectly secure
in the new stronghold he had captured and completed. But his supplies
depended upon a line of about one hundred and twenty miles of railroad
from Atlanta to Chattanooga, and very near one hundred and fifty miles
more from Chattanooga to Nashville. Hood, held at bay at Lovejoy's
Station, was not strong enough to venture a direct attack or undertake a
siege, but chose the more feasible policy of operating systematically
against Sherman's long line of communications. In the course of some
weeks both sides grew weary of the mere waste of time and military
strength consumed in attacking and defending railroad stations, and
interrupting and r