nts still resisted his entrance
to the Confederate camp, Grant once more moved by the left flank past
his enemy toward Richmond. Lee followed with equal swiftness along the
interior lines. Days passed in an intermitting, and about equally
matched contest of strategy and fighting. The difference was that Grant
was always advancing and Lee always retiring. On May 26, Grant reported
to Washington:

"Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and
the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside
of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the
_morale_ over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be
mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already
assured."

That same night, Grant's advance crossed the Pamunkey River at Hanover
Town, and during another week, with a succession of marching, flanking,
and fighting. Grant pushed the Union army forward to Cold Harbor. Here
Lee's intrenched army was again between him and Richmond, and on June 3,
Grant ordered another determined attack in front, to break through that
constantly resisting barrier. But a disastrous repulse was the
consequence. Its effect upon the campaign is best given in Grant's own
letter, written to Washington on June 5:

"My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north
of Richmond; then, after destroying his lines of communication on the
north side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side
and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. I
now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the
first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act
purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive
immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, they can
instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life
than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had
designed outside of the city."

During the week succeeding the severe repulse at Cold Harbor, which
closed what may be summed up as Grant's campaign against Richmond, he
made his preparations to enter upon the second element of his general
plan, which may be most distinctively denominated the siege of
Petersburg, though, in fuller phraseology, it might be called the siege
of Petersburg and Richmond combined. But the amplification is not
essential; for though