ls of Italy, the gigantic earthwork of the Alps. To storm
them, is impossible. But right and left of them, the German position has
two remarkable points--strategic points, which decided the fate of the
world.

They are two salient angles, promontories of the German frontier. The
one is north-east of Switzerland; the Allman country, between the head-
waters of the Danube and the Upper Rhine, Basle is its apex. Mentz its
northern point, Ratisbon its southern. That triangle encloses the end of
the Schwartzwald; the Black Forest of primaeval oak. Those oaks have
saved Europe.

The advantages of a salient angle of that kind, in invading an enemy's
country, are manifest. You can break out on either side, and return at
once into your own country on 'lines of interior operation;' while the
enemy has to march round the angle, three feet for your one, on 'lines of
exterior operation.' The early German invaders saw that, and burst again
and again into Gaul from that angle. The Romans saw it also (admirable
strategists as they were) and built Hadrian's wall right across it, from
the Maine to the Danube, to keep them back. And why did not Hadrian's
wall keep them back? On account of the Black Forest. The Roman never
dared to face it; to attempt to break our centre, and to save Italy by
carrying the war into the heart of Germany. They knew (what the invaders
of England will discover to their cost) that a close woodland is a more
formidable barrier than the Alps themselves. The Black Forest, I say,
was the key of our position, and saved our race.

From this salient angle, and along the whole Rhine above it, the Western
Teutons could throw their masses into Gaul; Franks, Vandals, Alans,
Suevi, following each other in echellon. You know what an echellon
means? When bodies of troops move in lines parallel to each other, but
each somewhat in the rear of the other, so that their whole position
resembles an echelle--a flight of steps. This mode of attack has two
great advantages. It cannot be outflanked by the enemy; and he dare not
concentrate his forces on the foremost division, and beat the divisions
in detail. If he tries to do so, he is out-flanked himself; and he is
liable to be beaten in detail by continually fresh bodies of troops. Thus
only a part of his line is engaged at a time. Now it was en echellon,
from necessity, that the tribes moved down. They could not follow
immediately in each other's track, beca