other hand, the Roman Empire had no reserves; while the campaign
had just come to that point at which he who can bring up the last reserve
wins. Ours were so far from being exhausted, that the heaviest of them,
the Franks, came into action, stronger than ever, 200 years after.
But the Roman reserves were gone. If Greece, if Asia Minor, if Egypt,
had been the holds of a hardy people, the Romans might have done
still--Heaven alone knows what. At least, they might have extended their
front once more to the line of Carthage, Sicily, Italy.
But the people of Syria and Egypt, were--what they were. No recruits, as
far as I know, were drawn from them. Had they been, they would have been
face to face with a Frank, or a Lombard, or a Visigoth, much what--not a
Sikh, a Rohilla, or a Ghoorka, but a Bengalee proper--would be face to
face with an Englishman. One thousand Varangers might have walked from
Constantinople to Alexandria without fighting a pitched battle, if they
had had only Greeks and Syrians to face.
Thus the Romans were growing weak. If we had lost, so had they. Every
wild Teuton who came down to perish, had destroyed a Roman, or more than
one, before he died. Each column which the admirable skill and courage
of the Romans had destroyed, had weakened them as much, perhaps more,
than its destruction weakened the Teutons; and had, by harrying the
country, destroyed the Roman's power of obtaining supplies. Italy and
Turkey at last became too poor to be a fighting ground at all.
But now comes in one of the strangest new elements in this strange
epic--Mohammed and his Arabs.
Suddenly, these Arab tribes, under the excitement of the new Mussulman
creed, burst forth of the unknown East. They take the Eastern Empire in
the rear; by such a rear attack as the world never saw before or since;
they cut it in two; devour it up: and save Europe thereby.
That may seem a strange speech. I must explain it. I have told you how
the Eastern Empire and its military position was immensely strong; that
Constantinople was a great maritime base of operations, mistress of the
Mediterranean. What prevented the Romans from reconquering all the
shores of that sea, and establishing themselves in strength in the Morea,
or in Sicily, or in Carthage, or in any central base of operations? What
forced them to cling to Constantinople, and fight a losing campaign
thenceforth. Simply this; the Mussulman had forced their position f
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