aric
could do it. Dietrich the Ostrogoth could do it. Alboin the Lombard
could do it, though not under such fearful disadvantages. There were
generals before Marlborough or Napoleon.

And do not fancy that the work was easy; that the Romans were degenerate
enough to be an easy prey. Alaric had been certainly beaten out of
Italy, even though the victory of Pollentia was exaggerated. And in 405,
Radagast with 200,000 men had tried to take Rome by Alaric's route, and
had simply, from want of generalship, been forced to capitulate under the
walls of Florence, and the remnant of his army sold for slaves.

Why was Alaric more fortunate? Because he was a great genius. And why
when he died, did the Goths lose all plan, and wander wildly up Italy,
and out into Spain? Because the great genius was gone. Native Teuton
courage could ensure no permanent success against Roman discipline and
strategy, unless guided by men like Alaric or Dietrich.

You might fancy the campaign over now: but it was not. Along the country
of the Danube, from the Euxine to the Alps, the Teutons had still the
advantage of interior lines, and vast bodies of men--Herules, Gepids,
Ostrogoths, Lombards--were coming down in an enormous echellon similar to
that which forced the Rhine; to force Italy at the same fatal
point--Venetia. The party who could command the last reserve would win,
as is the rule. And the last reserves were with our race. They must
win. But not yet. They had, in the mean time, taken up a concave line;
a great arc running round the whole west of the Mediterranean from Italy,
France, Spain, Algeria, as far as Carthage. They could not move forces
round that length of coast, as fast as the Romans could move them by sea;
and they had no fleets. Although they had conquered the Western Empire,
they were in a very dangerous position, and were about to be very nearly
ruined.

For you see, the Romans in turn had changed front at more than a right
angle. They lay at first north-west and south-east. They lay in
Justinian's time, north and south. Their right was Constantinople; their
left Pentapolis; between those two points they held Greece, Asia Minor,
Syria and Egypt; a position of wealth incalculable. Meanwhile, as we
must remember always, they were masters of the sea, and therefore of the
interior lines of operation. They had been forced into this position;
but, like Romans, they had accepted it. With the boundless common