he King of Spain's beard,"
and set, in the words of a recent biographer, "what to this day
may serve as the finest example of how a small, well-handled fleet,
acting on a nicely timed offensive, may paralyze the mobilization
of an overwhelming force."[1]

[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Corbett, Vol. II, p. 108.]

_The Grand Armada_

At the time of this Cadiz expedition Spanish preparations for the
invasion of England were already well under way, Philip being now
convinced that by a blow at England all his aims might be secured--the
subjugation of the Netherlands, the safety of Spanish America,
the overthrow of Protestantism, possibly even his accession to
the English throne. As the secret instructions to Medina Sidonia
more modestly stated, it was at least believed that by a vigorous
offensive and occupation of English territory England could be forced
to cease her opposition to Spain. For this purpose every province
of the empire was pressed for funds. Pope Sixtus VI contributed
a million gold crowns, which he shrewdly made payable only when
troops actually landed on English soil. Church and nobility were
squeezed as never before. The Cortes on the eve of the voyage voted
8,000,000 ducats, secured by a tax on wine, meat, and oil, the
common necessities of life, which was not lifted for more than two
hundred years.

To gain control of the Channel long enough to throw 40,000 troops
ashore at Margate, and thereafter to meet and conquer the army
of defense--such was the highly difficult objective, to assure
the success of which Philip had been led to hope for a wholesale
defection of English Catholics to the Spanish cause. Twenty thousand
troops were to sail with the Armada; Alexander Farnese, Duke of
Parma, was to add 17,000 veterans from Flanders and assume supreme
command. With the Spanish infantry once landed, under the best
general in Europe, it was not beyond reason that England might become
a province of Spain.

What Philip did not see clearly, what indeed could scarcely be
foreseen from past experience, was that no movement of troops should
be undertaken without first definitely accounting for the enemy
fleet. The Spanish had not even an open base to sail to. With English
vessels thronging the northern ports of the Channel, with 90 Dutch
ships blockading the Scheldt and the shallows of the Flanders coast,
it would be necessary to clear the Channel by a naval victory,
and maintain control until it wa