, PROBABLY ADOPTED WITH
SOME MODIFICATIONS AND SHOWING THE INFLUENCE OF GALLEY WARFARE]

On the morning of the 31st the Armada swept slowly past Plymouth
in what has been described as a broad crescent, but which, from a
contemporary Italian description, seems to have been the "eagle"
formation familiar to galley warfare, in line abreast with wide
extended wings bent slightly forward, the main strength in center
and guards in van and rear. Howard was just completing the arduous
task of warping his ships out of the harbor. Had Medina attacked at
once, as some of his subordinates advised, he might have compelled
Howard to close action and won by superior numbers. But his orders
suggested the advisability of avoiding battle till he had joined with
Parma; and for the Duke this was enough. As the Armada continued its
course, Howard fell in astern and to windward, inflicting serious
injuries to two ships of the enemy rear.

[Illustration: From Hale's _Story of the Great Armada._

THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL]

A week of desultory running battle ensued as the fleets moved slowly
through the Channel; the English fighting "loose and large," and
seeking to pick off stragglers, still fearful of a general action,
but taking advantage of Channel flaws to close with the enemy and
sheer as swiftly away; the Spanish on the defensive but able to
avoid disaster by better concerted action and fleet control. Only
two Spanish ships were actually lost, one of them Pedro de Valdes'
flagship _Neustra Senora del Rosario_, which had been injured in
collision and surrendered to Drake without a struggle on the night
of August 1, the other the big _San Salvador_ of the Guipuscoan
squadron, the whole after part of which had been torn up by an
explosion after the fighting on the first day. But the Spanish
inferiority had been clearly demonstrated and they had suffered
far more in morale than in material injuries when on Sunday, August
7, they dropped anchor in Calais roads. The English, on their part,
though flushed with confidence, had seen their weakness in organized
tactics, and now divided their fleet into four squadrons, with
the flag officers and Frobisher in command.

It betrays the fatuity of the Spanish leader, if not of the whole
plan of campaign, that when thus practically driven to refuge in
a neutral port, Medina Sidonia thought his share of the task
accomplished, and wrote urgent appeals to Parma to join or send
aid, th