ce on the American coast. If his plan had been followed and
properly executed the war might have been ended in America at one
blow. But this project died in the procrastination and red tape of
the Ministry of Marine, and a subsequent proposal for an attack
on Liverpool dwindled into the mere commerce-destroying cruise
which is memorable only for Jones's unparalleled fight with the
_Serapis_. Eventually the navy of France was thrown into the balance
to offset that of Great Britain, and it is largely to this fact
that the United States owes its independence; men and munitions
came freely from overseas and on one momentous occasion, the Battle
of the Virginia Capes, the French navy performed its part decisively
in action. But on a score of other occasions it failed pitiably on
account of the lack of a comprehensive strategic plan and the want
of energy and experience on the part of the commanding officers.

It is true that the French navy had made progress since the Seven
Years' War. In 1778, it possessed 80 good line of battle ships.
To this force, a year later, Spain was able to contribute nearly
sixty. But England began the war with 150. Thus even if the French
and Spanish personnel had been as well trained and as energetic
as the British they would have had a superior force to contend
with, particularly as the allied fleet was divided between the
ports of Spain and France, and under dual command. But in efficiency
the French and Spanish navies were vastly inferior to the British.
Spanish efficiency may be dismissed at the outset as worthless. For
the French officer the chief requisite was nobility of birth. The
aristocracy of England furnished the officers for its service also,
but in the French navy, considerations of social grade outweighed
those of naval rank, a condition that never obtained in the British.
In consequence, discipline--the principle of subordination animated
by the spirit of team work--was conspicuously wanting in the French
fleets. Individual captains were more concerned about their own
prerogatives than about the success of the whole. This condition
is illustrated by the conduct of the captains under Suffren in
the Bay of Bengal, where the genius of the commander was always
frustrated by the wilfulness of his subordinates. Finally in the
matter of tactics the French were brought up on a fatally wrong
theory, that of acting on the defensive, of avoiding decisive action,
of saving a fleet rather tha