aps the greatest humiliation on
England that she has ever suffered. Entering the Thames unopposed,
he was prevented from attacking London only by unfavorable wind and
tide. He then turned his attention to the dockyards of Chatham and
burnt or captured seven great ships of the line, besides numerous
smaller craft, carried off the naval stores at Sheerness, and then
for the next six weeks kept a blockade on the Thames and the eastern
and southern coasts of England. This mortifying situation continued
until the signing of the "Peace of Breda" concluded the war.

_The Third Dutch War_

Less than five years later Charles again made war on the Netherlands.
For this there was not the shadow of excuse, but Louis XIV saw
fit to attack the Dutch, and Charles was ever his willing vassal.
The English began hostilities without any declaration of war by
a piratical attack on a Dutch convoy.

At this juncture Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Attacked
on her land frontiers by France, then the dominating military power,
and on her sea frontiers by England, the strongest naval power, she
seemed to have small chance to survive. But her people responded
with a heroism worthy of her splendid history. They opened their
dykes to check the armies of invasion and strained every nerve to
equip a fleet large enough to cope with the combined navies of
France and England. In this Third Dutch War four great naval battles
were fought: that of Solebay, May 28, 1672, the two engagements
off Schooneveldt, May 28 and June 4, 1673, and that of the Texel,
August 11, 1673.

In all of these the honors go to the Dutch and their great admiral,
de Ruyter. Since these actions did not restore the Netherlands to
their old-time position or check the ascendancy of England, they
need not be discussed individually here. The outstanding feature
of the whole story is the surpassing skill and courage of de Ruyter
in the face of overwhelming odds. In this war he showed the full
stature of his genius as never before, and won his title as the
greatest seaman of the 17th century. After his death one must wait
till the day of Suffren and Nelson to find men worthy to rank with
him.

In this campaign de Ruyter showed his powers not only as a tactician
but as a strategist. In the words of Mahan, the Dutch "made a strategic
use of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which were based their
sea operations. To this they were forced by the desperate odds under
wh