n risking it for the sake of victory.
Hence, though they were skilled in maneuvering, and ahead of the
British in signaling, though their ships were as fine as any in
the world, this fatal error of principle prevented their taking
advantage of great opportunities and sent them to certain defeat
in the end.

Thus it is clear that the sea power of France and Spain was not
formidable if the English had taken the proper course of strategy.
This should have been to bottle up French and Spanish fleets in
their own ports from Brest to Cadiz. Such a policy would have left
enough ships to attend to the necessities of the army in America
and the pursuit of French and American privateers, and accomplished
the primary duty of preventing the arrival of French squadrons and
French troops on the scene of war. Here the British government
made its fatal mistake. Instead of concentrating on the coast of
France and Spain, it tried to defend every outlying post where
the flag might be threatened. Thus the superior English fleet was
scattered all over the world, from Calcutta to Jamaica, while the
French fleets came and went at will, sending troops and supplies
to America and challenging the British control of the sea. Had the
French navy been more efficient and energetic in its leadership
France might have made her ancient enemy pay far more dearly for
her strategic blunder. As it was, England lost her colonies in
America.

Instead of the swift stroke on the American coast which Paul Jones
had contemplated, a French fleet under d'Estaing arrived in the
Delaware about five months after France had entered the war and
after inexcusable delays on the way. In spite of the loss of precious
time he had an opportunity to beat an inferior force under Howe
at New York and seize that important British base, but his
characteristic timidity kept him from doing anything there. From
the American coast he went to the West Indies, where he bungled
every opportunity of doing his duty. He allowed St. Lucia to fall
into British hands and failed to capture Grenada. Turning north
again, he made a futile attempt to retake Savannah, which had fallen
to the English. Then at the end of 1779, at about the darkest hour
of the American cause, he returned to France, leaving the colonists
in the lurch. D'Estaing was by training an infantry officer, and
his appointment to such an important naval command is eloquent of
the effect of court influence in demoralizing the