hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of
these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out
of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general
discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the
infantry with the bayonet.

This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to
Spain and Portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of
troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could
be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable
to Belgium. At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a
gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field
of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this
plateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the plateau,
could discover the slightest movement in the French army, while his own
were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his
losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his
aid.

Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible
battle, which I have elsewhere impartially described. I demonstrated
that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of
deployed lines by the English, but to the following accidental causes,
viz.:--

1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attack
painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective,
and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery.

2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the
French, principally on the right wing.

3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the
infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each
other, but they were in no case simultaneous.

4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole Prussian
army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the
French.

Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and
the firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of the French infantry
had been thrown on the English in columns of battalions immediately
after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been
broken and forced back on Antwerp. Independently of this, if the
Prussians had not arrived, the English would have been compelled to
retreat; and I m