ho was sent after the battle of
Dresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who crossed the Elbe by swimming
and marched in the midst of the French columns as far, nearly, as
Wittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. The information
furnished by the partisan troops of Generals Czernicheff, Benkendorf,
Davidoff, and Seslawin was exceedingly valuable. We may recollect it was
through a dispatch from Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa,
intercepted near Chalons by the Cossacks, that the allies were informed
of the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with his
whole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified towns
of Lorraine and Alsace. This highly-important piece of information
decided Bluecher and Schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies,
which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought
to act in concert except at Leipsic and Brienne.

We know, also, that the warning given by Seslawin to General Doctoroff
saved him from being crushed at Borovsk by Napoleon, who had just left
Moscow in retreat with his whole army. Doctoroff did not at first credit
this news,--which so irritated Seslawin that he effected the capture of
a French officer and several soldiers of the guard from the French
bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. This warning, which
decided the march of Koutousoff to Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleon
from taking the way by Kalouga, where he would have found greater
facilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous
days of Krasnoi and the Beresina. The catastrophe which befell him would
thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented.

Such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what good
partisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers.

I will conclude this article with the following summary:--

1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the
enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of
reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable
officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners.

2. By multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matter
how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be
sifted from them.

3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means.

4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods
mentioned, a general should never move