tting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone
enough to make any man famous.

Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia,
Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and
Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were all
thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously
between Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or in
Germany having any conception of the object of these movements which
seemed so very complicated.

In the same manner, in 1815, when Bluecher had his army quietly in
cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington was
attending _fetes_ in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of
France, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed
with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been
but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon
Charleroi and Bluecher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points
of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the
plains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not
leave Paris until the 12th.)

The combinations described above were the results of wise strategic
calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of
logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures,
I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics
came very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having been
recalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria's taking up arms, and
being certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier into
Bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was
extended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was
returning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had
been on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the Strasbourg
route; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were moving from their
respective countries. The corps were thus separated by great distances,
and the Austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break
through this spider's web or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justly
uneasy, and ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war
had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it
in a more retired position toward Ulm.

The reason for this alternative order was