from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient
provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its
lines of depots.

5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in
their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it
is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and
without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under
these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not
impossible.

6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but
it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after
the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid
expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should
consist of the most portable articles,--as biscuit, rice, &c.: the
wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of
roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country,
and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these
vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to
take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the
successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry
with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour.

7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of
supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply
himself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of
a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications
with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus
exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the
mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army
advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its
communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the
progress of the army.

8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base
itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its
ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic
front opposed to the sea.

9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations
of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also
free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise
necessary. For this reas