ions. So, look
on it in any view, I see no result but war and consequent changes
in the form of government."

These letters, written at their dates, on the spur of the moment,
present the condition of affairs as viewed by General Sherman and
myself when they occurred.

With the conviction just stated General Sherman came to Washington
about the time of my election to the Senate. He was deeply impressed
with the certainty of war and of its magnitude, and was impelled
by the patriotic sentiment that, as he had been educated at the
expense of the government for military service, it was his duty,
in the then condition of the country, to tender his services. I
therefore escorted him to the White House. His statement of the
interview given in his "Memoirs" is not very full, for, while Mr.
Lincoln did say, in response to his tender, "I guess we will manage
to keep house," he also expressed a hope, which General Sherman
knew to be delusive, that the danger would pass by and that the
Union would be restored by a peaceful compromise. This was,
undoubtedly, the idea then uppermost in the minds of both the
President and Mr. Seward. At this time the public mind in the
north was decidedly in favor of concessions to the south. The
Democrats of the north would have agreed to any proposition to
secure peace and the Union, and the Republicans would have acquiesced
in the Crittenden Compromise, or in any measure approved by Lincoln
and Seward.

The period between the 4th of March and the 12th of April was the
darkest one in the history of the United States. It was a time of
humiliation, timidity and feebleness. Fortunately for the future
of our country the rebels of the south were bent upon disunion;
they were hopeful and confident, and all the signs of the times
indicated their success. They had possession of all the forts of
the south, except Fortress Monroe, Fort Sumter, and two remote
forts in Florida. They had only to wait in patience, and Fort
Sumter would necessarily be abandoned for want of supplies. Fortress
Monroe could not be held much longer by the regular army, weakened
as it was by the desertion of officers and men, and public sentiment
would not justify a call for troops in advance of actual war. The
people of South Carolina were frenzied by their success thus far,
and, impatient of delay, forced an attack on Fort Sumter, then held
by a small garrison under command of Major Robert Anderson. The
first gun