branches. We had the independent system, sometimes secured by
local bonds, sometimes by state bonds, sometimes by real estate,
sometimes by a mixture of these. We had every diversity of the
bank system in this country that has been devised by the wit of
man, and all these banks had the power to issue paper money. With
this multiplicity of banks, depending upon different organizations,
it was impossible to have a uniform national currency, for its
value was constantly affected by their issues. There was no common
regulator; they were dependent on different systems. The clearing
house system adopted in the city of New York applied only to that
city. There was no check or control over these banks. There was
a want of harmony and concert among them. Whenever a failure
occurred, such as that of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company,
it operated like a panic in a disorganized army; all of the banks
closed their doors at once and suspended specie payments.

Another objection to these local banks was that of their unequal
distribution among the states. In New England the circulation of
the banks was about $50,000,000, while in Ohio, a state with three-
fourths of the population of all New England, it was but $9,000,000.
The contrast, if made with other states, was still more marked.
I called attention to the fact that the circulation of banks in
the eastern states had then reached about $130,000,000, and of that
amount, $40,000,000 was circulating in the west. If these notes
were driven out of circulation and the United States notes substituted,
a contribution would be made to the treasury of the United States
of $2,400,000 a year, for the mere interest of a currency which
the west did not prefer, but was compelled to use.

I called attention to the loss to the people by counterfeiting,
which could not be avoided when we had such a multitude of banks.
It then required experts to detect counterfeits. It was impossible
to prevent counterfeiting. An expert could save the banks, but
the loss fell upon the people. By the substitution of national
currency we substantially could lose nothing by counterfeiting.
The notes would be few in kind, only three or four of them, all
issued by the United States, all of a uniform character, that could
not be counterfeited. I described, with some detail, the loss to
the people of the United States by bills of broken banks, computed
them to be equivalent to five per cent. per a