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concluded that no conspiracy for overturning the Government and "no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying of war."[728] The Burr Trial Not long afterward the Chief Justice went to Richmond to preside over the trial of Burr himself. His ruling[729] denying a motion to introduce certain collateral evidence bearing on Burr's activities is significant both for rendering the latter's acquittal inevitable and for the qualifications and exceptions made to the Bollman decision. In brief this ruling held that Burr, who had not been present at the assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island, could be convicted of advising or procuring a levying of war, only upon the testimony of two witnesses to his having procured the assemblage. This operation having been covert, such testimony was naturally unobtainable. The net effect of Marshall's pronouncements was to make it extremely difficult to convict one of levying war against the United States short of the conduct of or personal participation in actual hostilities.[730] AID AND COMFORT TO THE ENEMY; THE CRAMER CASE Since the Bollman case only three treason cases have ever reached the Supreme Court, all of them outgrowths of World War II and all charging adherence to enemies of the United States and giving them aid and comfort. In the first of these, Cramer _v._ United States,[731] the issue was whether the "overt act" had to be "openly manifest treason" or if it was enough if, when supported by other proper evidence, it showed the required treasonable intention.[732] The Court in a five-to-four opinion by Justice Jackson in effect took the former view holding that "the two-witness principle" interdicted "imputation of _incriminating acts_ to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness,"[733] even though the single witness in question was the accused himself. "Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses,"[734] Justice Jackson asserted. Justice Douglas in a dissent, in which Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black and Reed concurred, contended that Cramer's treasonable intention was sufficiently shown by overt acts as attested to by two witnesses each, plus statements made by Cramer on the witness stand. THE HAUPT CASE The Supreme Court sustained a conviction of treason, for the first time in its history in 1947 in Haupt _v._ Unit
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