ly period, when conditions are changing from
day to day, such information has any practical value.
Of course, it is not intended to maintain that one should not from the
very first moment after the declaration of War keep a sharp look-out
upon the enemy, work up to him, and seek to determine as much as
rapidity and daring can succeed, with any probability of success, in
attaining--that goes without saying. Particular value will always
attach to the taking of prisoners, whose regimental numbers enable us
to check the accuracy of our existing information. But against this we
must emphasize all the more forcibly that in this first period of
hostilities an inundation of the enemy's zone of concentration with
masses or by far-flung lines of patrols is not only not expedient, but
absolutely detrimental, since the certain cost of such undertakings
stands in no reasonable proportion to the probably negative, or at
most insignificant, result to be expected. Further, our own
concentration has already been so prepared in peace that it must be
carried out with clock-like regularity, even should the results of the
reconnaissance disclose that the conditions on the side of the enemy
were not quite those that we had originally expected.
Even the mere transference backwards of the line of strategic
deployment, which in 1870 could still be carried out without serious
difficulties or drawbacks, could nowadays, in view of the high tension
induced by modern conditions, only be executed with extraordinary
difficulty, whilst lateral displacement of such numbers is quite
inconceivable. For even if the railway organization would suffice for
the execution of such a design, the many other preparations in the
zone of concentration can neither be moved nor improvised.
Summarizing the whole question, the conclusion, I think, must be, that
only that Army which has at its disposal a great preponderance of
Cavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment of
its mounted forces.
In general, the difficulties of replacing the losses of the Cavalry
with material of equal quality are so great that only the most
important reasons could justify any such attempts. Hence the side
which is weaker in Cavalry will meet the circumstances best by keeping
back its horsemen, and not sacrificing its officers for infinitesimal,
and probably unattainable, advantages. It will be better merely to
work up to the enemy as close as may be possible wi
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