ubted then or since
that he was declaring the sincere intention of the cabinet. Nor was any
doubt possible that the intention of the cabinet entirely coincided at
that time with the opinion and wishes of the general public. The
operations in Egypt had not been popular,(72) and the national temper was
still as hostile to all expansion as when it cast out Lord Beaconsfield.
Withdrawal, however, was beset with inextricable difficulties. Either
withdrawal or annexation would have simplified the position and brought
its own advantages. Neither was possible. The British government after
Tel-el-Kebir vainly strove to steer a course that would combine the
advantages of both. Say what they would, military occupation was taken to
make them responsible for everything that happened in Egypt. This
encouraged the view that they should give orders to Egypt, and make Egypt
obey. But then direct and continuous interference with the Egyptian
administration was advance in a path that could only end in annexation. To
govern Egypt from London through a native ministry, was in fact nothing
but annexation, and annexation in its clumsiest and most troublesome
shape. Such a policy was least of all to be reconciled with the avowed
policy of withdrawal. To treat native ministers as mere ciphers and
puppets, and then to hope to leave them at the end with authority enough
to govern the country by themselves, was pure delusion.

So much for our relations with Egypt internally. Then came Europe and the
Powers, and the regulation of a financial situation of indescribable
complexity. "I sometimes fear," Mr. Gladstone wrote to Lord Granville
(Dec. 8, (M45) 1884), "that some of the foreign governments have the same
notion of me that Nicholas was supposed to have of Lord Aberdeen. But
there is no one in the cabinet less disposed than I am to knuckle down to
them in this Egyptian matter, about which they, except Italy, behave so
ill, some of them without excuse." "As to Bismarck," he said, "it is a
case of sheer audacity, of which he has an unbounded stock." Two months
before he had complained to Lord Granville of the same powerful personage:
"Ought not some notice to be taken of Bismarck's impudent reference to the
English exchequer? Ought you to have such a remark in your possession
without protest? He coolly assumes in effect that we are responsible for
all the financial wants and occasions of Egypt."

The sensible reader would resist any attempt to dra