act, on his way from
London to Port Said, Gordon had suggested that with a view to carrying out
evacuation, the khedive should make him governor-general of the Soudan.
Lord Granville authorised Baring to procure the nomination, and this Sir
Evelyn did, "for the time necessary to accomplish the evacuation." The
instructions were thus changed, in an important sense, but the change was
suggested by Gordon and sanctioned by Lord Granville.(91)

(M59) When Gordon left London his instructions, drafted in fact by
himself, were that he should "consider and report upon the best mode of
effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan." He was also to
perform such duties as the Egyptian government might wish to entrust to
him, and as might be communicated to him by Sir E. Baring.(92) At Cairo,
Baring and Nubar, after discussion with Gordon, altered the mission from
one of advice and report to an executive mission--a change that was
doubtless authorised and covered by the original reference to duties to be
entrusted to him by Egypt. But there was no change in the policy either at
Downing Street or Cairo. Whether advisory or executive, the only policy
charged upon the mission was abandonment. When the draft of the new
instructions was read to Gordon at Cairo, Sir E. Baring expressly asked
him whether he entirely concurred in "the policy of abandoning the
Soudan," and Gordon not only concurred, but suggested the strengthening
words, that he thought "it should on no account be changed."(93) This
despatch, along with the instructions to Gordon making this vast
alteration, was not received in London until Feb. 7. By this time Gordon
was crossing the desert, and out of reach of the English foreign office.

On his way from Brindisi, Gordon had prepared a memorandum for Sir E.
Baring, in which he set out his opinion that the Soudan had better be
restored to the different petty sultans in existence before the Egyptian
conquest, and an attempt should be made to form them into some sort of
confederation. These petty rulers might be left to accept the Mahdi for
their sovereign or not, just as they pleased. But in the same document he
emphasised the policy of abandonment. "I understand," he says, "that
H.M.'s government have come to the irrevocable decision not to incur the
very onerous duty of granting to the peoples of the Soudan a just future
government." Left to their independence, the sultans "would doubtless
fight among themselves.